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Variations of a Common Theme: An Analysis of
Louisiana's Experience with Harmless Error in Criminal
Cases
Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it
in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. Many
are plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some,
for all the benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the
way for a plague of followers that deplete trials of fairness.
The well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance for harmless
errors adrift in an imperfect world. Its well-being must also
encompass the capacity to ward off the destroyers. So an inquiry
into what makes an error harmless, though one of philosophical
tenor, is also an intensely practical inquiry into the health and
sanitation of the law.'
INTRODUCTION
"There is good news, and there is bad news. First the good news:
The court below erroneously admitted the coerced confession. And now
the bad news: The error was harmless and the conviction stands."
Recently, holdings such as this hypothetical one have become substan-
tially more common in the realm of criminal law. Accordingly, the
harmless error doctrine has become the very essence of criminal law
today.2 Although this doctrine effectuates several strong policy consid-
erations, American courts have been, with only minimal analysis, raking
more and more errors under this rule.' Moreover, when the courts have
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, Foreword (1970).
2. Professor Goldberg has estimated that approximately ten percent of appellate
criminal cases throughout the country are determined by a finding of harmless consti-
tutional error. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 421 (1980).
3. Interestingly, Dean Paul M. Hebert predicted in 1932: "[I]n spite of these general
principles, which, if adhered to, would prevent reversals where justice has been done,
in dealing with the various classes of cases in which the problems arise we will note a
tendency of the Supreme Court to reverse many criminal cases when the error might
properly be considered harmless." Paul M. Hebert, The Problem of Reversible Error in
Louisiana, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 184 (1932) (emphasis added).
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analyzed the harmless error issue with any detail, their standards of
analysis have not been consistent. The trend seems to be that the criminal
will not go free-regardless of the magnitude of the constable's blunder
(or anyone else's blunder).4
In analyzing Louisiana's standard of appellate review5 of error in
criminal cases, the writer will first discuss the origin of the harmless
error doctrine. Second, the writer will examine the policies surrounding
the doctrine, as well as the various "tests" the courts have used. Third,
the writer will specifically analyze Louisiana's experience with the doc-
trine with a view toward determining the present state of Louisiana
law on this subject as well as what the courts are likely to do next.
Finally, the writer will recommend a preferred standard of review.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
A. The Origin of the Harmless Error Rule in England
The original rule of harmless error in the English system was that
an error by the court in admitting or rejecting a piece of evidence was
not, standing alone, sufficient grounds for setting aside the verdict and
ordering a new trial, unless after considering all the evidence, it appeared
to the judge that the truth had not been reached.6 This rule lasted until
1835, when the Court of Exchequer announced a different rule-that
an error in the judge's ruling created a "per se" right to a new trial
for the defeated party.7 This rule became known as the "Exchequer
Rule. "
Under the Exchequer Rule, an error concerning the admission or
rejecion of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice. The English
courts stringently applied this presumption-even to the most insignif-
icant items of evidence. As a result, retrials became so commonplace
in England that litigation "seemed to survive until the parties expired.",
4. People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
5. The harmless error doctrine is applied principally during appellate review; how-
ever, it also may be applied at the trial level by a judge who becomes convinced that
certain evidence was improperly admitted when faced with the question of whether to
grant a new trial. McCormick on Evidence § 182 at n.2 (Edward W. Cleary et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCormick].
6. 1 John H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in
Trials at Common Law § 21, at 365 (3d ed. 1940). This rule existed for both civil and
criminal cases.
7. Crease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 919 (1835), cited in Wigmore, supra note 6, §
21, at 367.




Parliament responded to this problem with the Judicature Act of
1873. This act precluded a new trial unless "in the opinion of the
Court of Appeal some substantial wrong or miscarriage has thereby
been occasioned." 9 Although the act did not define the phrases "sub-
stantial wrong" and "miscarriage of justice," it did direct the courts
to look to the actual impact of the error on the outcome of the
proceeding.' 0
B. The Evolution of America's Harmless Error Rule
1. The Roots
Although American courts adopted their own version of the Ex-
chequer Rule, they were not as readily influenced by England's rejection
of it. The American courts extended the rule to a much broader spectrum
of errors." For example, in State v. Sheppard,2 the defendant was
charged with one of the foulest and most brutal murders recorded in
the annals of crime. 3 During the trial a witness for the state testified,
in the absence of the defendant, as follows:
Q: What is your name, please?
A: Flora Ayers.
Q: What is your husband's name?
A: Jont Ayers.' 4
The court noticed that the defendant was still in jail and suspended
trial until the defendant was present. After the defendant was brought
in, the prosecutor asked the witness the same questions, to which the
witness responded with the same answers. Although the defense did
not object or take an exception at the time, at the conclusion of trial,
he did move to have the judgment arrested and the verdict thereby set
aside. The trial court denied the motion. 5
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia noted:
Johnson, P., quotes and approves the strongest part of the
opinion in Jackson's Case and then says: "We will not inquire




12. 39 S.E. 676 (W. Va. 1901).
13. Id. at 677-78. Mr. Sheppard was accused of ax-murdering his wife and seven
year old child.




the cross-examination of the witness in his absence .... He had
the right to observe every look, gesture, or move of the witness
while he was testifying; and it mattered not that the court
excluded the evidence and certified that it was repeated in his
presence." From these authorities it is clearly a matter of no
consequence that the evidence introduced in this case in the
absence of the prisoner may not have affected him, and that
he did not at the time take an exception .... [Sluch an error
cannot be cured.16
There was a similar result closer to home in State v. Larocca.17 In
that case, the defendant stood trial for having carnal knowledge with
a girl under eighteen years old. Accordingly, one element the prosecution
had to prove was that the victim was under eighteen years old. To
prove this element, the prosecution called the victim's mother to the
stand. On direct examination the mother had trouble remembering the
date of her daughter's birth. On cross examination the defense counsel
brought out the fact that the mother could not remember the birthdates
of the rest of her five children. The mother then testified that the only
knowledge she had as to the victim's birthdate was from a birth cer-
tificate. Although the trial court would not allow the certificate into
evidence, the court did not preclude the witness from testifying. The
supreme court held that since the certificate was not a "contempora-
neous memorandum made by the witness herself at the time, it could
not be used for the purpose of refreshing her memory."' 8 The court
considered the error as well as the trial judge's instruction to the jury:
"'Age, however, can be proven by witnesses who know the age of a
person, or by the mother of the person or by baptismal records.""' 9
The court noted that since the jury could have given effect to both
what was said by the witness with reference to the certificate and to
its physical production and identification as such in the jury's presence,
the conviction had to be overturned and the case remanded for a new
trial.
On rehearing in State v. Larocca,20 the Louisiana Supreme Court
again dealt with the issue of harmless error. In Larocca's second trial,
the prosecution had attempted to prove the victim's age by the testimony
of a priest. The priest stated that he had baptized the victim when she
was a month old. The priest produced the record he had made at the
baptism. The defense counsel objected to the testimony because the
16. Id. at 689-90.
17. 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924).
18. Id. at 572, 100 So. at 721.
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. State v. Larocca, 157 La. 50, 101 So. 868 (1924) (on rehearing).
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priest's only first-hand knowledge of the baby's age was what the baby's
mother had told him, that is, the statement was hearsay. The court
overruled the objection, and the defense counsel reserved the bill of
exceptions. Larocca was again convicted.
On appeal the court rejected the argument that the admission of
the hearsay evidence as to the victim's age was harmless because the
jurors saw her and thereby had an opportunity to judge her age. The
court stated:
When illegal evidence has been received on behalf of the state,
in proof of a matter of importance in a criminal prosecution,
the trial is illegal, no matter how much legal evidence was
received. In such case, we cannot know whether a conviction
is founded only upon the legal evidence or wholly or in part
upon the illegal evidence.2 '
The court would retry Larocca for a third time. 22
Regardless of the propriety or impropriety of this trend, decisions
such as this apparently raised neither the legal profession's nor the
criminal justice system's image in the public eye. The American people
considered the appellate courts as "impregnable citadels of technicality"
in criminal matters. 2a This public disapproval eventually spurred the
legislatures around the country to create statutory regulations to govern
the treatment of trial court errors on appeal. The enactment of the
legislation was inevitable. Just as much then as now, courts are not
entirely free from public sentiment. 24 Furthermore, as the crime situation
worsens, it appears likely that fewer convictions will be overturned on
appeal and stricter legislation will be passed.
In 1919, Congress passed the first of its harmless error statutes.
This statute eventually became 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and it currently
provides as follows: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari
21. Id. at 55, 101 So. at 869 (emphasis added).
22. Although this result may be contrary to certain policy notions behind the harmless
error rule, namely judicial efficiency, it does seem to be in line with the often-disregarded
promise to a citizen that he is entitled to a fair trial.
23. Hon. Marcus A. Kavanaugh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice
by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925). Accord John H. Wigmore,
Criminal Procedure: "Good" Reversals and "Bad" Reversals, 4 Il. L. Rev. 352 (1903).
See, e.g., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S. Ct. 183 (1897); People v. Bell,
53 Cal. 119 (1878).
24. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1160-61. As Professor Saltzburg notes, the appellate
courts were appropriate targets for public criticism because the public wanted the con-
victions that were provided by the trial courts. Thus, even if the reversal was for a
good reason, the public would likely disapprove, and the outcry would be even louder
if the conviction were reversed on a technicality. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of
Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 1006 n.56 (1973).
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in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties. '2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(a) provides quite similarly: "Any error, defect, irregularity or var-
iance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. 2 6
All of the states that did not already have harmless error statutes of
their own eventually followed suit.27 Indeed, Louisiana adopted its first
harmless error statute in 1928.28 The problem, however, is that the
courts have not consistently applied these statutes.
2. The Jurisprudence
Although there is a plethora of cases construing the harmless error
rule,29 there have been several seminal cases. In Kotteakos v. United
States,30 the Supreme Court dealt with the question of "whether pe-
titioners [had] suffered substantial prejudice from being convicted of
a single general conspiracy by evidence which the Government admit[ted]
proved not one conspiracy [as was charged in the indictment], but some
eight or more different ones of the same sort executed through a
common key figure."3 In construing the federal harmless error rule,
the Court provided the following standard:
If, when all is said and done, the [court] is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the
verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where
the departure is from a constitutional norm or specific command
of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial
rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether
there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982).
26. Fed. R. Cr. P. 52(a). The text of this statute is very close to that of Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 921: "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed
by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does
not affect substantial rights of the accused." The evolution of Article 921 will be
discussed, infra.
27. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). For a
list of the early decisions and statutes of the various jurisdictions, see Wigmore, supra
note 6, § 21, at 373 et seq.
28. La. R.S. 15:557 (1928 La. Acts, No. 2, § 1, art. 557).
29. As of 1980, Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, itself had been cited over
6000 times in Shepard's U.S. Citations. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 421 n.2.
30. 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946).
31. Id. at 752, 66 S. Ct. at 1241.
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affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand .32
To show the shift in the federal jurisprudence, Kotteakos can be
contrasted with the more recent and probably most seminal', case of
Chapman v. California.34 There, the Court tackled the question of the
applicability of harmless error rules to federal constitutional errors. The
defendants had been convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and murder."
At the trial of these charges, the prosecutor, pursuant to the express
wording of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, 36 took
advantage of the defendants' failure to testify. Following the Consti-
tution, the trial judge instructed the jury that adverse inferences could
be drawn from the defendants' failure to testify.
3 7
Between the trial and the time that Chapman's case reached the
state's high court, the United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v.
California,3 held that a practice of inferring guilt from a defendant's
decision not to testify was in violation of the United States Constitution.
The California Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed Chapman's con-
viction because, in its opinion, there was no "miscarriage of justice"
as per California's own harmless error provision. 9 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the error was
subject to a harmless error analysis and, if so, whether the error was
in fact harmless.
Justice Black, for the majority, wrote the opinion with a four-step
analysis. First, since it was a federal right that was violated, federal
32. Id. at 764-65, 66 S. Ct. at 1247 (footnotes and citations omitted).
33. See Goldberg, supra note 2.
34. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). Although there have been many "harmless
error" cases out of the U.S. Supreme Court since 1967 and between 1946 and 1967,
Chapman was chosen because it is the "seed" of Louisiana's construction and application
of the harmless error rule, notwithstanding the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court
has recently relied heavily on language from Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246
(1991). Compare Chapman to State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980) and State v.
Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991). For other U.S. Supreme Court cases since Chapman,
see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S. Ct. 725 (1986); Rose v. Clark, 478
U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173
(1978); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969); and Yates v.
Evatt, IIl S. Ct. 1884 (1991).
35. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18-19, 87 S. Ct. at 825.
36. Article 1, § 13, California Constitution, provided in pertinent part: "[I]n any
criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny
by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon
by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
37. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18-19, 87 S. Ct. at 825.
38. 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
39. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20, 87 S. Ct. at 826.
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law, rather than state law should apply.4 Second, in noting the utility
of the harmless error rules, he decided that in some cases some con-
stitutional errors are so unimportant and insignificant that, consistent
with the federal constitution, they may be deemed harmless.4 1 Third,
in noting the possible drawbacks of harmless error rules, he utilized
the Court's preferred federal harmless error rule: Is there "a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction." 42 Finally, in applying the harmless error rule to the
facts of the case, he reasoned that "[sjuch a machine-gun repetition
of a denial of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make
petitioners' version of the evidence worthless, can no more be considered
harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced con-
fession. 43
Although the Court ultimately remanded for a new trial, the case
would have numerous repercussions in the realm of criminal law. No
longer did the harmless error rule apply only to evidentiary rulings. As
the Supreme Court has become more and more conservative throughout
the 1970s and up through today, the Court has been able to rake more
and more errors beneath the umbrella of the federal harmless error
rule. This trend has been both lauded and criticized." Thus, the policies
underlying the harmless error rule must be examined in order to analyze
Louisiana's use of the doctrine.
II. THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
A. Point-Counterpoint: The Policy Behind the Harmless Error
Rule
The rationale for regarding some errors as harmless rests largely
upon considerations of economy and judicial efficiency 5. 4  But what has
happened to those policies which spurred the Exchequer-type rules in
the first place? One policy that must be kept in mind when considering
an application of the harmless error rule is the distinction between the
roles of the jury and the appellate court.4" It is the juror who determines
40. Id. at 20-21, 87 S. Ct. at 826-27.
41. Id. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
42. Id. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827 (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84
S. Ct. 229, 230 (1963)).
43. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26, 87 S. Ct. at 829. Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
44. See generally Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 368 et seq. and Traynor, supra
note 1.
45. McCormick, supra note 5, § 182.
46. The relevance of this distinction will become more apparent in the next section,




facts, not the appellate judge. Thus, an appellate court's review of the
facts of a trial can be said to be a usurpation of the fundamental
rights to a jury and a fair trial.4 7
However, some would say this theory is absurd because it ignores
the doctrine and history of the jury function, for it has always been
under the control and correction of the trial and appellate courtsa.4
The judge determines questions of fact upon which the admissibility
of evidence depends. Furthermore, the judge determines whether the
evidence is sufficient to go to the jury and whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. "The 'usurpation,' if any consists in setting
aside the verdict, not in confirming it.'149
Is this theory necessarily so absurd? Generally, a defendant would
not allow an appellate judge to sit on a jury. At the least, the defendant
would find out who the judge was before failing to exercise a peremptory
challenge. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an attorney would
try a case to a panel of appellate judges, he would not agree to waive
his closing argument, nor to allow the new "jury" to know that a
previous jury found the defendant guilty. Nor would the attorney allow
the members of the "jury" to go back to their offices and review their
notes at their own pace until they reach a decision. Any attorney who
would agree to these circumstances would probably not have a problem
with a three-person jury convicting the defendant by a vote of two to
one.50
Furthermore, although a criminal defendant is not entitled to a
perfect trial,"' one must remember that evidentiary rules are not designed
in a vacuum. Each rule, by balancing probative value, by excluding
unreliable evidence, by barring extraneous matter, and by guiding the
judge and jury in the proper performance of their decision-making
function, is intended to play a role in guaranteeing a fair trial. Each
rule reflects the policy of the state with respect to fairness regardless
47. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.
Ct. 1628 (1972); and Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979). These
decisions form the framework of the criminal defendant's right to trial by jury.
48. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 370.
49. Id. In a quite poetic response to the theory of these rights, Wigmore wrote:
As well might a gardener cut down a thriving vine because his henchman has
used a hoe instead of a spade in planting it; or a farmer bring valuable bantams
to the block because they were hatched by a meddlesome duck instead of their
lawful parent. A glance at common affairs will awaken us to the intrinsic
absurdity of the theory of legal right.
Id. at 369.
50. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 430-31.
51. Lutwack v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S. Ct. 481 (1953).
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of the identity of the defendant.52 "[T]he safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." 53
Another policy factor that must. be considered is the harmless error
rule's promotion of prosecutorial misconduct. It has been said that the
harmless error rule, as recently applied, "tacitly informs prosecutors
that they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or procedural viol-
ations not against a legal or ethical standard of appropriate conduct,
but rather, against an increasingly accurate prediction that the appellate
courts will ignore the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to
prove the defendant's guilt." '5 4 Moreover, even in cases in which the
evidence does not weigh heavily against the defendant, the increasing
possibility of an error being said to be harmless can give the prosecutor
an incentive to act unethically; for, in such a situation, he has nothing
to lose and everything to gain through the unethical behavior."
52. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 989.
53. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 436 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
54. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 425 (1992).
55. Id. at 431. Professor Gershman cites the following cases and explanations for
situations in which federal courts have found prosecutorial misconduct harmless: United
States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 133 (1991)
(prosecutor's allusions to greed in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice were not sufficiently
shown to be anti-Semitic references, although prosecutor "could have chosen his words
more carefully"); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1991) (pros-
ecutor "mischaracterized the jury's role" by alluding to the grand jury's indictment as
proof that case was a "federal case" but remarks were harmless); Fisher v. Nix, 920
F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's "misleading" remarks were harmless); United
States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990) (court does not decide whether
prosecutor's "highly improper" remarks that denigrated role of jury would have been
basis for reversal); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1562-63 (lth Cir. 1990)
(prosecutor's appeal to jury to act as conscience of the community not improper when
not "intended to inflame"); United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 1990)
(prosecutor's remarks that defendant [was] a "liar;" a "clumsy, thick tongued thug;"
and a "bozo" were improper but harmless); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 894-
95 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991) (prosecutor's statement that
defendant used tactics favored by Adolf Hitler were inflammatory but harmless); United
States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct.
1138 and 493 U.S. 1094, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1991) (prosecutor's inflammatory statement
that drugs "are poisoning our community[,J and our kids die because of this" were
harmless); United States v. Parker, 604 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1979) (evidence of prior
conviction was not harmless); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990) (inflammatory reference to victim's death
was harmless); United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1989) (improper
racial reference to "Cuban drug dealer" was harmless); United States v. Rodriguez-
Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 158-59 (1st Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's reference to defendant as
"liar" and "crook" was improper but harmless); Hopkinson v. Shillenger, 866 F.2d
1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's expression of fear after murder of prospective witness
was improper but harmless); Shepard v. Lane, 818 F.2d 615, 621-22 (7th Cir.), cert.
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Although these comments may be said by the more "law-and-order"
types to be a bit hyperbolic, they do show the need for great care by
the courts when making determinations of harmlessness-especially since
it appears that the harmless error rule is here to stay.
B. Different Approaches for Demonstrating Harmlessness
Although the Supreme Court espoused several fundamental prin-
ciples in Chapman which have been somewhat consistently followed,
the content of the federal standard has not always been explicitly
addressed. Given the necessity of showing harmlessness "beyond a
reasonable doubt," the question remains how to make this showing of
"harmlessness."
1. The Federal Approaches
American courts have approached the issue of harmlessness in a
variety of ways. 6 The methods of analysis used differ in light of the
particular court's focus; that is, when determining whether a given error
is harmless, a court will typically analyze the nature of the error;" the
strength or presence of the remaining, properly-admitted evidence;5" or
the trial court's verdict.5 9
denied, 484 U.S. 929, 108 S. Ct. 296 (1987) (calling defendant liar, dog, animal, and
stating it was too bad arresting officer had not broken defendant's skull was "grossly
improper" but harmless); Clark v. Wood, 823 F.2d 1241, 1251 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 945, 108 S. Ct. 334 (1987) (calling defendant a master liar, and that many
persons believe he is "100% guilty" was improper but harmless); United States v.
Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1395 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.
Ct. 1034 (1988) (derogatory remarks about defense lawyer were improper but harmless);
United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.
Ct. 162 (1987) (comparing defendant's denial of criminal intent with Peter's denial of
Christ was grossly improper but harmless); United States v. Lowenberg, 853 F.2d 295,
302 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032, 109 S. Ct. 1070 (1989) (calling defendant
a "filthy pimp" and his lawyer a "jack-in-the-box" for making repeated objections was
improper but harmless); United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1428-29 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S. Ct. 2857 and 488 U.S. 1011, 109 S. Ct. 799 (1989)
(inflammatory remarks about defense counsel were harmless); United States v. Jones,
839 F.2d 1041, 1049-50 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1024, 108 S. Ct. 1999 (1988)
(claiming that defense counsel suborned perjury was "reprehensible" but harmless). Id.
at 428 n.226.
56. Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-
A Process in Need of Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 16 (1976); Traynor, supra note
1; Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 367 et seq.
57. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125
(La. 1991) (on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990)).
58. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89. S. Ct. 1726 (1969).
59. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967); State v. Gibson,
391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
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In Chapman v. California, 60 the Court, rejecting tests which focus
on the remaining, properly-admitted evidence, 61 relied on the test es-
poused in its earlier decision of Fahy v. Connecticut:62 Is there "a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have con-
tributed to the conviction." 63 This test focuses on the improperly-
admitted evidence or the actual error. A court employing this test
considers the possible effect the actual error had on the verdict. 64
In Harrington v. California,65 the United States Supreme Court
apparently used another test. The Court focused on the duplicative or
cumulative nature of the excluded evidence, that is, the Court analyzed
whether there was properly-admitted evidence which tended to prove
the same thing as the erroneously-admitted evidence. In Harrington,
the trial court, in violation of Bruton v. United States,66 admitted
confessions of two codefendants who did not take the stand at the
defendant's trial. The confessions placed the defendant at the scene of
the crime; however, several eyewitnesses and the defendant's own state-
ment also placed the defendant at the scene. Furthermore, the third
codefendant, who did take the stand, placed Harrington at the scene
with a gun in his hand. Justice Douglas for the majority concluded
that since the statement of the defendant that put him at the scene
and the confession of the third codefendant were cumulative with the
erroneously-admitted confessions, the Bruton violation did not harm
the defendant. 67
In Milton v. Wainwright, 6 the Supreme Court indicated that con-
sideration of the untainted evidence would not be limited to precisely
matching cumulative evidence. This case dealt with the harmlessness of
the admission of the defendant's confession. The Court held that even
if the confession had been taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment,
the defendant suffered no prejudice, because the record included prop-
erly-admitted evidence that overwhelmingly pointed to the defendant's
60. Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824.
61. Id. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
62. 375 U.S. 85, 84 S. Ct. 229 (1963).
63. Id. at 86-87, 84 S. Ct. at 230. For a discussion of Chapman, see supra text
accompanying notes 34-45.
64. See generally Traynor, supra note 1, at 22-25.
65. 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969).
66. 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that
when the state puts two defendants on trial in the same case, any statement made by
one defendant which inculpates the other defendant cannot be admitted at the trial.
67. The Court did note that, apart from the confessions, the evidence against the
defendant was overwhelming. Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254, 89 S. Ct. at 1728.
68. 407 U.S. 371, 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972).
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guilt. 69 This test had been expressly repudiated less than ten years earlier
in Chapman.70
Professor Field notes it is possible to come up with a situation in
which a conviction may be reversed under the "overwhelming evidence"
test and not under the "contributed-to-the-verdict" approach. 71 For
example, a particular constitutional error, if viewed alone, may lead a
court to conclude that it could not have possibly influenced the jury.
(For example, a defendant may have given an exculpatory statement
without first having been given his Miranda72 warnings.) However, the
other evidence in the case may fall short of being "overwhelming,"
while still being sufficient to sustain the verdict. 73
Field also notes that different results can be achieved by switching
between an analysis using the "overwhelming evidence" approach and
one using the "cumulative" evidence approach. For example, a defen-
dant makes, on five different occasions, five identical statements to the
police. All of the statements deny guilt, but they incriminate the de-
fendant by placing him at the scene of the crime and thus provide a
critical link in the chain of evidence against him. The first four state-
ments were volunteered, but the fifth was given in violation of Miranda.
The prosecutor introduced all statements at trial. The "cumulative
evidence" approach would find the fifth statement harmless because it
is identical in content to the other four statements. The "overwhelming
evidence" test would, standing alone, find the admission harmless if
the remaining evidence was compelling, as opposed to simply legally
69. Although the challenged confession was described as containing "incriminating
statements . . . essentially the same as those given in the prior confessions," the majority
did not characterize it as "cumulative." Id. at 375-76, 92 S. Ct. at 2177.
70. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). This
test was apparently also repudiated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764,
66 S. Ct._1239, 1247-48 (1946). Section 167 of Sir James F. Stephen's Indian Evidence
Act represents yet another approach to the determination of an error's harmlessness.
That act provided:
The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself
for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to
the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the
evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the
decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to
have varied the decision.
Indian Evidence Act § 167 (Stephen's ed. 1872), quoted in Wigmore, supra note 6, §
21, at 367 n.8.
71. For convenience, the writer will use Professor Field's terminology and refer to
the Chapman-type test as the "contributed-to-the-verdict" test, the Harrington-type test
as the "cumulative evidence" test, and the Milton-type test as the "overwhelming evi-
dence" test.
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
73. Field, supra note 56, at 19.
19931 1589
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
sufficient .74 Although these different "tests" are essentially aimed at
the same target-determining whether the error was "harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt"-courts that are less sympathetic to the rights of
the accused could select a particular test according to the result that
test would achieve.
2. Texas' Approach to Harmless Error
Texas has adopted its own approach to the determination of harm-
lessness. The general Texas rule is: To be classified as harmless, the
state must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no
contribution to the conviction or the punishment." 75
In Harris v. State,76 the court noted that the appellate court's role
in conducting a harmless error analysis is not to put itself in the place
of the jury and determine how it would have decided the case. Rather,
the court is to determine how the error affected the verdict. The court
noted that an "overwhelming evidence" test is an erroneous standard
because the Texas statutory rule focuses on the error itself and not the
weight of the untainted evidence. The court did acknowledge, however,
that it was impossible to measure the effect of the error without also
considering the evidence that was properly before the court. As such,
it noted that the proper focus of the weight of the untainted evidence
of guilt is an assessment of whether overwhelming evidence dissipates
the error's effect upon the jury's function in determining the facts so
that it did not contribute to the verdict or punishment. 77 Accordingly,
the court set out factors for appellate courts to consider in applying
the rule:
1. the source and nature of the error;
2. the extent to which the state used the error throughout the
course of the trial;
3. the probable collateral implications of the error;
4. the probable weight a juror would place on such an error;
and
74. Id. at 40.
75. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2). Thus, it appears that Texas has adopted the first
approach discussed in the previous subsection-the "contributed-to-the-verdict" test. One
important exception to this rule, however, is that an error cannot be held harmless if
it results from the violation of a mandatory statute. However, a statute is not mandatory
merely because of its obligatory language. For a discussion of this exception, see Charles
D. Bubany, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Criminal Procedure: Trial and Appeal, 45
Sw. L.J. 293 (1991).
76. 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
77. Id. at 587.
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5. the likelihood that a finding of harmlessness would encourage
the State to repeat the error with impunity.
78
The reviewing court should apply these factors in light of the policies
of maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice process and a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.79 Moreover, the court should apply these
factors within a two-step framework. The court is first to isolate the
error and its effects. Second, the court is to ask itself "whether a
rational trier of fact might have reached a different result if the error
and its effect had not resulted." 80
Although the Texas harmless error rule is essentially the "contrib-
uted-to-the-verdict" test as discussed in the previous subsection, Texas
has taken its analysis a step further. By providing factors with which
other reviewing courts can work, the Texas court has taken steps to
maintain a balance of its policies, without rote reliance on the United
States Supreme Court.
III. Ti LOUISIANA EXPERIENCE
A. Louisiana's Statutory Harmless Error Rule
1. The Statutes
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:557 was Louisiana's original "harm-
less error" provision.8" This provision was changed to Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure article 921 in the 1966 revision of the Criminal
Code. The new article essentially retained the same language. 82 In 1979,
78. Id.
79. Id. at 588.
80. Id. See also Arnold v. State, 786 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 838, 111 S. Ct. 110 (1990), in which the court set out nine factors
for courts to determine harmlessness in the context of parole law instruction.
81. La. R.S. 15:557 provided:
No judgment shall be set aside, or a new trial granted by any appellate court
of this State, . . . unless in the opinion of the court ...after an examination
of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory
right.
1928 La. Acts No. 2, § 1, art. 557. It was while this article was in place that Dean
Paul M. Hebert wrote his law review article on prejudicial error in Louisiana. Hebert,
supra note 3.
82. 1966 La. Acts No. 310, § 1. The Official Revision Comments note that the
article retains the "sacramental" language of the former statute and omitted only the
"unnecessary and cumbersome verbiage." La. Code Crim. P. art. 921, official revision
comment (a).
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the article was rewritten to provide (as it presently does): "A judgment
or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any
error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial
rights of the accused." 3 The statute appears to provide a fair, easily-
applicable standard for the accused-if the error affects an accused's
right that the court deems substantial, then the court should reverse
the conviction.
2. Jurisprudence Construing the Louisiana Harmless Error
Statutes
For some time after Article 921's inception, the courts generally
tended to apply the statute textually. For example, in State v. Ferguson, 4
the court held that the trial judge's reversal of the order of challenging
jurors violated a substantial right guaranteed to the accused. At voir
dire, nine veniremen had been examined. Two of them were accepted
by the state and the defendant. The district attorney examined three
more jurors and then tendered them to the defense for examination.
After the defense examined the prospective jurors, the defense counsel
tendered the prospective jurors back to the state for the state's rejection
or acceptance of them-before the defendant exercised his right to
accept or peremptorily reject them. The trial judge ruled: "[Tihe 'district
attorney had the right to examine the jurors and tender them to counsel
for defendant for acceptance or rejection with the right on the part of
the district attorney to re-examine said jurors if he so desired and to
accept or reject them as he [saw] fit.""'83 Accordingly, defendant ex-
hausted his peremptory challenges before the jury panel was completed.
Justice Fournet, writing for the majority, noted the trial court's
admission of error in its ruling.16 If the prospective juror is tendered
83. 1979 La. Acts No. 86, § 1.
84. 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937).
85. Id. at 870, 175 So. at 603.
86. Id. at 873, 175 So. at 605. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:358 provided:
The jurors shall be tendered first to the prosecution, and, if accepted, then
tendered to the defense. After a juror has been accepted by both sides, neither
side has the right to challenge him peremptorily, but it shall be within the
discretion of the court, and not subject to review to allow either side to
peremptorily challenge jurors up to the time that the jury is impaneled.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:359 provided: "Although a juror may have been accepted
by both the prosecution and the defense, he may, none the less, up to the beginning
of the taking of evidence, be challenged for cause by either side, or be excused either
for cause or by consent of both sides." These statutes were included in the 1966 revision
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure as articles 789 and 795, respectively. 1966
La. Acts No. 310, § 1. The basic substance of the former statutes was included within
the revision, and the reasoning of the Ferguson line of cases was included to clarify the
law. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 789 and 795, official revision comments.
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to the defense, after the juror has been examined on his voir dire,
then such is in itself an acceptance of the juror by the district attorney.
The state must first exercise its right of challenge and then present the
juror to the defendant for his acceptance or rejection. 7 The court then
held that the improper procedure violated the accused's right to per-
emptorily challenge jurors under article I, section 10 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921.11 Since this right is substantial, then the conviction
must be reversed.8 9This case illustrates the court's textual application of the statutory
harmless error rule. The court neither conducted a balance of policies
nor weighed the evidence against the accused. Rather, the court merely
applied the statute as it was written.
During this period, the court did not limit its definition of "sub-
stantial right" to constitutional violations. 90 For example, in State v.
Robinson,9' the court held that improperly-admitted opinion testimony
was a violation of an accused's substantial right. In State v. Ray,92 the
court held that the failure to tell the jury that the court admitted a
prior inconsistent statement only for credibility and not as substantive
evidence of the defendant's guilt was reversible error.93
87. Ferguson, 187 La. at 876, 175 So. at 605.
88. Louisiana Constitution article I, section 10 (1921) provided: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; and when tried by jury shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily,
the number of challenges to be fixed by law." Cf. La. Const. art. I, § 17 (1974).
89. Ferguson, 187 La. at 876, 175 So. at 605.
90. Although the revised Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 did not
keep the exact language of former Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:557 ("substantial vi-
olation of a constitutional or statutory right." (emphasis added)), the comments to article
921 make it clear that no change was intended, as the drafters kept the "sacramental
language." The drafters omitted only the "unnecessary and cumbersome verbiage." La.
Code Crim. P. art. 921, official revision comment (a).
91. 223 La. 595, 66 So. 2d 515 (1953), on rehearing. In Robinson, a negligent
homicide case, a police officer who arrived at the accident scene thirty to forty-five
minutes after the accident, was qualified as an expert and was permitted to testify as
to the speed of the vehicles. Cf. State v. Maines, 183 La. 499, 164 So. 321 (1935)
(holding an error in the admission of opinion evidence harmless because the jury was
just as competent to draw the conclusions as the witness); State v. Scott, 221 La. 643,
60 So. 2d 71 (1952) (holding an error in the admission of opinion evidence harmless).
92. 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971). Although the court did not require a motion
for a limiting instruction in this case, on rehearing, it did note that it would prospectively
require such a motion. Cf. La. Code Evid. art. 105 and comment thereto.
93. Accord State v. Doucet, 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933) (reversible error when
court misinstructed the jury when the jury asked about mercy recommendations); State
v. Gendusa, 190 La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938) (omission in the indictment caused the
verdict to be invalid, hence reversible error); State v. Keen, 215 La. 577, 41 So. 2d 223
(1949) (failure to allow defendant to cross examine state's witness as to his previous
indictments was reversible error when credibility of witness was important); State v.
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There really should be no difficulty in this area of law in Louisiana.
The legislature has spoken (long ago), and its message is clear: if an
error affects substantial rights of the accused, then the reviewing court
should reverse the conviction. The courts would only need to determine
the definition of a "substantial right." This too should not be too
difficult. It would appear that nearly any violation of an evidentiary
rule would be a violation of a substantial right. As stated earlier, the
rules of evidence were not designed in a vacuum. Each rule, by balancing
probative value, by excluding unreliable evidence, by barring extraneous
matter, and by guiding the judge and jury in the proper performance
of their decision-making functions, is intended to play a role in the
guarantee of a fair trial. The legislature, in enacting the evidence code,
enumerated certain rights that litigants have. If one right, for example
the right not to have hearsay evidence admitted at one's trial, is found
harmless, then the prosecutor will have no incentive to refrain from
tendering the same type of evidence the next time he tries a case.
Moreover, trial judges will not have to worry about reversal. The result
is that certain rights guaranteed by the legislature will become hollow.
Although it would be nearly impossible to categorize all of the
various types of errors that would presumably "ring a bell" as not
being harmless in the mind of a reviewing judge, the writer will attempt
to briefly survey the recent jurisprudence regarding the "status" of a
number of specific types of error before specifically analyzing the
Louisiana courts' jurisprudential harmless error rule. 94
Green, 231 La. 1058, 93 So. 2d 657 (1957) (judge's comment on facts of case in overruling
an objection was reversible error because the defendant should have been granted a
mistrial); State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153 So. 2d 401 (1963) (while defendant was not
present, the trial judge substituted an alternate juror when the judge had the juror
brought to chambers and permitted him to state that he felt there was a conflict of
interest); State v. Johnson, 229 La. 476, 86 So. 2d 108 (1956) (reversible error when
the trial judge refused to instruct the jury to disregard gratuitous testimony relative to
an oral confession). Contra State v. Gunter, 180 La. 145, 156 So. 203 (1934) (harmless
error to admit testimony of defendant's wife); State v. Killgore, 186 La. 233, 172 So.
2 (1937) (since defendant ultimately convicted of manslaughter, possible improper exclu-
sion of testimony which tended to reduce murder charge to manslaughter was harmless);
State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So. 2d 221 (1941) (harmless error when prosecutor
asked an improper question and withdrew it after defendant's counsel objected but before
the witness answered it); and State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So. 2d 315 (1955) (no
reversible error when trial judge refused to appoint disinterested physicians to examine
the defendant when an issue in the case was insanity at the time of the alleged offense).
94. The writer will attempt to tailor the following sections to those listed in Hebert,
supra note 3, at 184-200. This brief survey will present the law regarding errors in areas
of law not listed as "structural errors" in Cage, infra-complete denial of counsel, an
impartial judge, exclusion of members of defendant's race from the grand jury, denial
of the right to self-representation at trial, violation of the right to a public trial, and
selection of a jury with racially based exclusions-which will presumably always warrant
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3. A Brief Survey of Error in Specific Areas
a. Overruling a Motion for a Bill of Particulars
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 484 and 485 provide
for the filing of a motion for a bill of particulars. 95 The articles reflect
the constitutional requirement that the accused must be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 96 The bill of
particulars is designed to inform the accused of what the state intends
to prove so that he may properly defend himself. 97 As has been the
case for quite some time, the decision whether to grant a bill of
particulars rests solely within the discretion of the trial judge. Accord-
ingly, the judge's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of abuse which results in prejudice to the accused. 9
b. Arraignment and Pleading to the Indictment
In Louisiana, the arraignment consists of the reading of the in-
dictment to the defendant and the court calling upon the defendant to
enter a plea. The arraignment's purpose is to join issues between the
state and the defendant. 99 The United States Constitution requires that
the guilty plea be voluntary.' °° Before a trial court can accept a guilty
plea from a defendant, the record must show that the defendant was
"Boykinized." That is, the record must show that the defendant fully
waived (1) his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, (2) his
Fifth Amendment right to trial by jury, and (3) his Sixth Amendment
right to confront and cross examine witnesses against him. Waiver will
not be presumed from a silent record. The dialogue between the de-
fendant and the trial judge must reflect that the defendant was aware
that he was waiving his "Boykin rights," or the plea will be set aside.' 0'
c. Refusal of a -Continuance
As is the case with a motion for a bill of particulars, the decision
whether to grant a continuance rests largely in the discretion of the
a reversal. As such, the following sections will for the most part update Dean Hebert's
sections.
95. 1978 La. Acts No. 735, § 2; 1981 La. Acts No. 440, § 1.
96. La. Code Crim. P. art. 484, official revision comment (a). La. Const. art. 1,
§ 13 (1974). See also Comment, James A. Hobbs, The Bill of Particulars in Criminal
Trials, 12 La. L. Rev. 457 (1952).
97. State v. Nelson, 306 So. 2d 745 (La. 1975).
98. State v. Huizar, 332 So. 2d 449 (La. 1976).
99. La. Code Crim. P. art. 551 and comment (a).
100. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
101. State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 868 (La. 1981). See also State v. Scott, 461 So.
2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); State v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 966 (La. 1981); and State v.
LaFleur, 391 So. 2d 445 (La. 1980); and State v. Bowick, 403 So. 2d 673 (La. 1981).
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trial court.'0 2 The trial judge's ruling, whether it be because the defense
counsel did not have time to prepare or because witnesses were absent,
will not be disturbed on appeal unless such is manifestly prejudicial to
the rights of the accused. 03
In State v. Leopold,104 the court held that the trial judge committed
reversible error when he refused a continuance requested because of
the absence of a material defense witness. The sole reason for refusing
the continuance was a desire to try the case before an important
prosecution witness left the state.
In State v. Brett,0 5 the defendant, charged with murder, was con-
victed of manslaughter. The defendant moved for a continuance because
of the absence of certain witnesses who would testify as to facts that
would tend to prove the defendant was guilty of manslaughter rather
than murder. The trial judge denied the continuance. The Supreme
Court held the trial judge's error was harmless because the jury ulti-
mately convicted the defendant of manslaughter. If, on the other hand,
the defendant had been convicted of murder, then the trial judge's
denial of the continuance would have been reversible error.
d. Selection of the Jury
Generally, an erroneous ruling of a trial judge which results in
depriving a defendant of one of his peremptory challenges constitutes
a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right and thus
is reversible error.' °0 The same is true when the defendant is improperly
denied a challenge for cause. 0 7 However, for reversible error to result
from a denial of a challenge for cause, the defendant must have
exhausted all of his peremptory challenges before the selection of the
jury is complete. 0 Furthermore, after jeopardy attaches, the right of
a defendant to have particular jurors, who have been selected to try
102. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 707-715 and comments thereto. The revision of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure in 1966 did not change the rules regarding
continuances. Id.
103. State v. Satcher, 124 La. 1015, 50 So. 835 (1909).
104. 169 La. 749, 126 So. 48 (1930). The summary of this case is essentially that
which appears in Hebert, supra note 3, at 186. The case is apparently still good law.
105. 6 La. Ann. 658 (1851). This case was also summarized in Hebert, supra note
3, at 186. This case too is apparently still good law.
106. State v. McIntyre, 365 So. 2d 1348 (La. 1978). See La. Code Crim. P. arts.
782-808. See also State v. Ferguson, 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937), discussed in
subsection entitled "Jurisprudence Construing the Louisiana Harmless Error Statutes,"
supra, at notes 85-95.
107. State v. Isgitt, 590 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 766-67.
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the defendant, is a substantial right, the deprivation of which, without
good cause, warrants a reversal. 1' 9
Notwithstanding the above-cited examples, recent Louisiana courts,
when dealing with issues of harmless error, have generally not relied
on the text of Article 921. Instead, the courts have tended to fashion
their own "tests," on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether par-
ticular errors are harmless.'' 0
B. Louisiana's Jurisprudential Harmless Error Rule
1. Vacillations Among Standards by the Louisiana Courts
In general, the recent Louisiana jurisprudence is riddled with in-
consistent applications of the harmless error rule. The trend appears
that the courts are holding all but the most blatant violations harmless.
It is curious that Dean Hebert remarked in 1932 that: "[I]n spite of
these general principles, which, if adhered to, would prevent reversals
where justice has been done, in dealing with the various classes of cases
in which the problems arise we will note a tendency of the Supreme
Court to reverse many criminal cases when the error might properly
be considered harmless.""' The pendulum now swings in the other
direction. With all due deference, it appears that either the standard
is not fully understood or that "hard facts make bad law."
In 1974, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down the opinion
of State v. Michelli." 2 In Michelli, a hearsay statement was admitted
into evidence. The Supreme Court evidenced its distrust of the harmless
error standard by practically disregarding the Chapman opinion, which
was handed down just seven years before. Instead, the court, in con-
struing the pre-1979 language of Article 921, relied on certain language
from the 1946 decision of Kotteakos." 3 The court noted that an error
which had little or no influence on the jury would nevertheless warrant
a reversal if the error resulted from the departure from a constitutional
norm." 4 Since there was a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right, the conviction would be reversed."'
109. State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153 So. 2d 401 (1963).
110. An update of Dean Hebert's subsection regarding errors in the charge to the
jury is excluded because of the Cage decision, which is discussed, infra text accompanying
notes 136-142.
111. Hebert, supra note 3, at 184.
112. 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
113. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946).




Moreover, the court expressly repudiated the "overwhelming evi-
dence" test." 6 The administration of the test requires that the entire
trial record be before the appellate court, and such a practice is contrary
to the Louisiana Constitution, which extends the appellate jurisdiction
to questions of law only." 7 The court also noted that the Louisiana
courts are not as free as the United States Supreme Court to institute
new rules of law and procedure where the legislature has spoken. Later
that same year, the Louisiana Supreme Court again repudiated the
"overwhelming evidence" test in State v. Herman."'
Similarly, in State v. Muse," 9 the Supreme Court again evidenced
its mistrust of the harmless error rule. In Muse, the defendant was
charged with using a pistol to commit a battery upon Jerome Hamilton.
Hamilton was a bystander victim of a drive-by-shooting-type incident.
At trial, a state's witness was questioned about the victim's reputation
in the community. The prosecutor objected. The judge sustained the
objection. The trial judge reasoned that the victim's general reputation
in the neighborhood was strictly irrelevant and immaterial to the issue
before the court-especially since the victim was an innocent by-
stander. 20 The Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Summers, writing for the majority, noted that an attack on
the witness' credibility may have mitigated the evidence pointing to the
guilt of Muse. Thus, the trial court did not permit the defendant to
fully cross examine the state's witness-in violation of article I, section
16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.121 Justice Summers further
noted:
The right of confrontation occupies the status of a paramount
and fundamental right indispensable to a fair trial. It is a
substantial, substantive and valuable right which assures the
accused that he shall have the opportunity to be confronted by
the witnesses against him and this includes not only the right
to attend the trial and hear the witnesses but also the right to
116. Id. at 580-81.
117. Id. at 580, n. 7 (citing La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921)). Cf. La. Const. art.
V, § 5(C) (1974), which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution,
the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. In
criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law." La. Const.
art. V, § 10 (1974) provides similarly for the courts of appeal.
118. 304 So. 2d 322, 325 (La. 1974). The court followed the reasoning set forth in
Michelli,
119. 319 So. 2d 920 (La. 1975).
120. Id. at 921.
121. Article I, section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides in pertinent




cross-examine them at the trial. It is a constitutional right, not
a mere privilege. 22
Although the opinion did not go into a detailed harmless error
analysis, it did refuse to hold the error harmless. Justice Summers
reasoned: "We cannot subscribe to the trial judge's opinion that the
error was harmless for we do not know what defense counsel may have
elicited from the witness, nor its effect upon the jury's determination
of the defendant's guilt."''
This reasoning did not last, for later the same year the Supreme
Court did an "about face" and adopted the "overwhelming evidence"
test in a line of cases that did not even acknowledge the test's incon-
sistency with the constitution or Michelli. This line of cases that utilized
the "overwhelming evidence" test would continue until 1980.124
In State v. Gibson,'25 the court returned to the Michelli end of the
continuum. Although the court did not return to the strict language
of Michelli as Herman did, the court did return to the basic policies
underlying the decisions. In Gibson, the court noted that notwithstand-
ing Article 921's amendment, the Louisiana Constitution still extends
appellate jurisdiction only to questions of law in criminal matters. 26
Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court may not act as a surrogate jury
and "substitute its determination of what the jury, in the absence of
the error, would or should have decided in place of the jury's actual
verdict.' ' 27 Accordingly, the court adopted the Chapman standard:
[T]he federal harmless error standard, as stated and applied in
Chapman v. California, is the standard most compatible with
this Court's view of its own criminal appellate jurisdiction.
Whether there is a reasonable possibility that the constitutional
error complained of might have contributed to the conviction
is a question of law to which our appellate jurisdiction ex-
122. Muse, 319 So. 2d at 922-23 (citing State v. Giordano, 259 La. 155, 249 So. 2d
558 (1971) (emphasis added)).
123. Id. at 923. Accord State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1989) (holding that
a violation of the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation with an alleged child
victim of indecent behavior was not harmless error) and State v. Jenkins, 476 So. 2d
475 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (holding it is prejudicial error to limit a defendant's right
to cross examine a state's witness about that witness' criminal charges in order to show
bias).
124. See, e.g., State v. Berain, 360 So. 2d 822 (La. 1978); State v. Meunier, 354
So. 2d 535 (La. 1978); State v. Stripling, 354 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1978); State v. Williams,
347 So. 2d 184 (La. 1977); State v. Fort, 311 So. 2d 851 (La. 1975); and State v. Ivy,
307 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975).
125. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
126. Id. at 426 (citing La. Const. art. V, § 5(C) (1974)).
127. Id. at 427.
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tends. ... Focusing on the incriminating quality of the tainted
evidence is less intrusive on the jury's function than the over-
whelming evidence test.'28
The court also noted that this standard is more consistent with the
notion that all accused persons, even if guilty, are entitled to a fair
trial. "Injudicious application of the harmless error doctrine tends 'to
shield from attack errors of a most fundamental nature and thus to
deprive many defendants of basic constitutional rights.""9129
Notwithstanding the strong language of Gibson, the courts seemingly
went on as though nothing had ever happened. The "overwhelming
evidence" test again reared its ugly head. 130 However, it was not alone.
In another line of cases, the court was applying the "cumulative evi-
dence" test. In State v. Banks, 3' the Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Circuit noted that notwithstanding Gibson, several cases since then have
used both the "overwhelming evidence" test and the "cumulative ev-
idence" test. The court then applied the test and upheld the conviction. 32
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and reversed. "I
In reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court evidenced a
"lack of enthusiasm" for the "cumulative evidence" test and "distin-
guished and seemingly limited the post-Gibson cases."' 34 Presumably
breathing new life into Gibson, Chief Justice Dixon, writing for the
majority, stated: "It cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the improperly admitted hearsay .. . did not contribute to the ver-
dict."' 3 5 However, the court would again turn around. 3 6
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 427 (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 257, 89 S. Ct. 1726
(1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
130. See, e.g., State v. Billiot, 421 So. 2d 864 (La. 1982); State v. Quimby, 419 So.
2d 951, 958 (La. 1982); State v. Moore, 414 So. 2d 340, 347 (La. 1982); State v. Smith,
408 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (La. 1981); State v. Perry, 408 So. 2d 1358, 1362 (La. 1982);
State v. Connor, 403 So. 2d 678, 680 (La. 1981); and State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1179,
1180 (La. 1981).
131. 428 So, 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 439 So. 2d 407 (1983). See also
State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466 (La. 1981); State v. Darby, 403 So. 2d 44 (La. 1981);
State v. Spell, 399 So. 2d 551 (La. 1981); and State v. Bodley, 394 So. 2d 584 (La.
1981).
132. Banks, 428 So. 2d at 546-47.
133. State v. Banks, 439 So. 2d 407 (La. 1983).
134. George W. Pugh & James R. McClelland, Evidence, Developments in the Law,
1983-84, 45 La. L. Rev. 309 (1984).
135. Banks, 439 So. 2d at 410 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Dixon reasoned:
The hearsay information injected into the case by the officer cannot be harmless.
It explained why the police were where they were, why they were on the
lookout, and why they approached him as soon as he was identified, wearing
the clothes described by the informer. Without the forbidden hearsay, the jury
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COMMENTS
In May 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided State v. Cage.13 7
In Cage, the court dealt with the harmlessness of an erroneous jury
instruction on reasonable doubt given during the guilt phase of defen-
dant's trial. In holding the error harmless, the court relied heavily on
the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Arizona v. Ful-
minante 3 s In so relying, the court distinguished between "trial errors"
and "structural errors." Trial errors occur during the presentation of
a case and must be assessed in the context of the other evidence to
determine whether the admission at trial is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Structural errors, or structural defects in the trial mechanism,
affect the framework of the trial and consequently cannot be subjected
to a harmless error analysis.3 9 The court held that the erroneous jury
might have had considerably more difficulty rejecting the testimony of the
defense witness Gooden.
Id.
136. In State v. Creel, 540 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 546
So. 2d 169 (1989), the court nonetheless applied the "cumulative evidence" test to hearsay
testimony involving the charges of crime against nature and aggravated crime against
nature. This case is especially egregious. In Creel, the alleged victim was punished by
his bus driver for misconduct on the bus. The victim's older brother approached the
bus driver and asked her that she not report the misconduct to the school authorities
because the brothers' foster father would force the victim to engage in oral copulation
as punishment. The bus driver then reported the brother's statement to the appropriate
authorities. Accordingly, the foster father was charged with aggravated crime against
nature. At the trial the bus driver testified to the above. The brother was not even
called as a witness. Thus, the brother's out-of-court statement was offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted and was clearly hearsay. La. Code Evid. arts. 801-806. The
court held that the error was harmless. Arguably, the problem with this reasoning is
that some foster children do not care for their foster parents. Therefore, there was at
least a possible incentive for the older brother to lie. Furthermore, when the facts and
circumstances are viewed as a whole, there could have been a situation in which the
older brother was merely coming to the rescue of his younger brother to keep him out
of trouble. If the brother were called to the stand, then the jury could have weighed
the credibility of the brother; hence, the policies underlying the hearsay rules would be
satisfied. Although, the foregoing is mainly hypothesis, the court should have at least
given it consideration. Instead, the court held the error harmless because the bus driver's
testimony was essentially the same as the victim's testimony. This case is a clear example
of the problems which surround the courts' switching back and forth between harmless
error approaches. It also illustrates the problems within this area of law in general.
Surely, the right not to have hearsay evidence admitted against you is a substantial right
as per Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921.
137. 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991) (on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, Ill S.
Ct. 328 (1990)).
138. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). Fulminante held that illegally admitted coerced confessions
are subject to a harmless error analysis.
139. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1127. Examples cited by the court of structural errors are
provided in the following cases: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792
(1963) (complete denial of counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927)
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instruction was a trial error and was thus subject to a harmless error
analysis.
When it applied the harmless error analysis, the court did not cite
a single Louisiana case. Rather, it relied entirely on the federal juris-
prudence. Particularly, it relied on the federal jurisprudential interpre-
tations of Chapman and held that the Chapman standard "mandates
consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for
constitutional errors that may be harmless."140 The court then proceeded
to analyze the facts of the case under the "overwhelming evidence"
test: "Because of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's
guilt, the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction given ...during the
guilt phase of trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 141 The
court then switched into a sufficiency analysis when analyzing the
erroneous jury instruction's effect on the sentencing stage of the trial. 4
Ironically, the court concluded:
Viewing the record as a whole, the jury had sufficient evidence
to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .... The
erroneous instruction by the trial judge did not contribute to
the defendant's conviction or sentence. Accordingly, the erro-
neous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 43
What is the standard after Cage?1' As pointed out earlier, the courts
have not been consistent in their analyses or standards when applying
the harmless error test. The jurisprudence prior to and including Cage
makes this obvious. Furthermore, the courts have for the most part
strayed from a statutory approach to harmless error.
(impartial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) (exclusion of
members of defendant's race from grand jury); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104
S. Ct. 944 (1984) (denial of right to self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984) (violation of the right to a public trial); and Powers
v. Ohio, 11 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (selection of a jury with racially based exclusions).
140. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1128 (quoting United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 508
n.7, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1980 n.7 (1983)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1129.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Recently in State v. Smith, 600 So. 2d 1319, 1326 (La. 1992), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a Cage-like jury instruction was not harmless. Noting Justice
Lemmon's concurrence in Cage ("In conducting a harmless error analysis, we do not
merely excise the error and review the remainder of the record for sufficiency under
Jackson v. Virginia [443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979)]."), Justice Cole for the majority
applied the "contributed-to-the-verdict" test, citing State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421 (La.
1980) and Yates v. Evatt, II S. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991) (to say an error did not
"contribute" to the verdict is to find the error unimportant in relation to everything




The reasoning of Cage is disturbing. The court once again com-
pletely disregarded the sound reasoning of Gibson. In doing so, it
completely ignored both Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
921 (Is the right to have the jury determine guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt not a substantial right?) and article V, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution. As such, the court has once again compounded the un-
predictability of the Louisiana law in this area. Although one may
agree with the court because the defendant apparently "did it," such
a conclusion misses the point. All defendants, guilty or not, deserve a
fair trial. Allowing a court to look at the record and weigh the facts
in this manner is an upside down interpretation.
Accordingly, if the courts are not going to textually apply Article
921, then they should at least return to the Gibson standard, streamlined
by the five-factor approach used by the Texas courts. Again these
factors are: (1) the source and nature of the error; (2) the extent to
which the state used the error throughout the course of the trial; (3)
the probable collateral implications of the error; (4) the probable weight
a juror would place on such an error; and (5) the likelihood that a
finding of harmlessness would encourage the prosecution to repeat the
error with impunity.
These factors clearly focus on the main points of the "contributed-
to-the-verdict" approach, which is arguably the most consistent with
the power of the Louisiana courts. If the court were to use these
factors, the standard of review as well as the important policies would
be clear to courts in the future. Moreover, the courts would be in line
with their constitutional mandate-no appellate review of facts. Fur-
thermore, in using this test, the courts would still be taking into con-
sideration the economics of justice. Accordingly, the best balance would
be made, and the jagged line of Louisiana harmless error cases would
finally be straightened out.
V. CONCLUSION
For some period after the inception of Louisiana's statutory harm-
less error rule, the courts tended to try to textualjy apply the statute.
However, such has not been the case in recent years. The Louisiana
courts have vacillated among the various jurisprudentially created harm-
less error "tests"-often in contravention of an accused's "substantial
rights." Thus, with the harmless error doctrine in such a flux right
now, the Louisiana courts should reexamine the policies they wish to
promote in this area of law. As such, the integrity of the criminal
justice system and the provision of a fair trial to all should top the
list. Regardless of the test used, if the test is changed every two or
three years, then neither of these policies is promoted. Accordingly,
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the Louisiana Supreme Court should pick one test and stay with it so
the rule can develop. If the courts must use the jurisprudential rules
instead of textual, statutory analysis, then the Gibson approach is
preferable. If the courts apply this approach by using the Texas courts'
factors, then they will, while still providing a balance to the economics
of judicial review, provide a fair standard that is in line with the
criminal appellate jurisdiction provided by the Louisiana Constitution.
For, as the late Dean Paul M. Hebert said:
The problem of prejudicial error is a problem in professional
psychology. No rules can be framed which will solve it, for
rules can only be drawn in general terms, and it is in the
interpretation of the rules that the difficulty comes. 41
Addison K. Goff, IV
145. Hebert, supra note 3, at 170 (citing Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of
Appellate Review, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 126 (1926)).
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